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Abstract—A class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games
with imperfect information structure is investigated. The game
involves an arbitrary number of players, modeled as homoge-
neous Markov decision processes, aiming to find a sequential
Nash equilibrium. The players are coupled in both dynamics
and cost functions through the empirical distribution of states
and actions of players. Two non-classical information structures
are considered: deep state sharing and no-sharing, where deep
state refers to the empirical distribution of the states of players. In
the former, each player observes its local state as well as the deep
state while in the latter each player observes only its local state.
For both finite- and infinite-horizon cost functions, a sequential
equilibrium, called deep Nash equilibrium, is identified, where
the dynamics of deep state resembles a convolutional neural net-
work. In addition, an approximate sequential equilibrium, called
sequential mean-field equilibrium, under no-sharing information
structure is proposed, whose performance converges to that of
the deep Nash equilibrium despite the fact that the strategy is
not necessarily continuous with respect to the deep state. The
proposed strategies are robust to trembling-hand imperfection in
both microscopic and macroscopic levels. Finally, the extension
to multiple sub-populations and arbitrarily-coupled (asymmetric)
cost functions are demonstrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games are ubiquitous in
decision-making applications such as finance, management
and smart grid, wherein a group of players compete with
each other in order to minimize (maximize) their cost (utility)
functions. It is well known that when every player perfectly
observes the states of all players, a backward induction can
be devised to identify a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
(called Markov perfect Nash equilibirum), which is a set of
strategies satisfying sequential rationality requirement [1]. In
practice, however, it is not always possible to have perfect
information about the states of players for various reasons
such as the cost of information (specially when the number
of players is large) and the privacy of the players. In such a
case, the information structure is imperfect, which generally
results in a phenomenon, known as the infinite regress of the
compound expectation, wherein every player must know what
others know about what he/she knows about what they know
and so on [2]. In the seminal work of Harsanyi [2], a method
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is proposed to stop the infinite regression by imposing the
common knowledge hypothesis among players. The solution
concept in such games, known as Bayesian games, is a pair of
strategy-belief (rather than only the strategy), where the belief
and strategy are consistent. Since the belief space increases
exponentially with time horizon as well as the number of
players, it is computationally difficult to find a tractable
solution for such games with more than a few players [3].
In addition, it is not always feasible to find a sequential
equilibrium in dynamic games with imperfect information due
to the fact that the belief of every player about the states
of other players depends on the strategy of other players, in
general. As a result, each player’s belief does not necessarily
evolve in a Markovian manner, i.e., the standard backward
induction is not applicable [4].
Due to the above difficulties, mean-field games [5], [6] were
introduced more than a decade ago to provide an approximate
solution by exploiting two key features: negligible effect of in-
dividual players and the law of large numbers. More precisely,
since the effect of a single player on the infinite population
is negligible, the sequential rationality requirement reduces to
a conventional dynamic programming decomposition, and the
belief of every player about other players reduces to a common
belief (known as the mean-field) that evolves deterministically
in time. This type of strategy-belief pair is called mean-field
equilibrium, which is presented in the form of two coupled
forward-backward equations, where the backward equation
is a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the forward one
is a Fokker-Plank-Kolmogorov equation. The consistency re-
quirement is also established by imposing various Lipschitz-
type fixed-point conditions (that generally hold for small time
horizons) or monotonicity-type assumptions (that are often
difficult to verify). In order to show that the mean-field
equilibrium constitutes an approximate equilibrium for the
finite-population game, the standard approach is to assume
implicitly or explicitly that the solution is continuous in the
mean-field. For more details, the reader is referred to [7] and
references therein.
While the above results are interesting and useful in some
applications, an often overlooked question is that to what
extent the mean-field equilibrium is practical. For example,
the mean-field equilibrium is not a “sequential” equilibrium [8]
or “trembling-hand” equilibrium [9] in the sense that it does
not take into account the off-equilibrium-path events occurred
at the macroscopic level. In other words, players agree upon
the trajectory of the mean-field before the game starts, but
there is no guarantee that they hold on to the initially agreed-
upon belief at every stage of the game if an unexpected
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event changes their belief about the mean-field (e.g., small
common mistakes). In addition, the decision of each player
at any stage of the game depends not only on the past
decisions of the players but also on the future ones, which
makes the mean-field equilibrium future-dependent. Another
practical concern is the unnatural assumption that the strategy
is continuous in the mean field. It is argued in [10] that
such assumption may remove many meaningful equilibria. In
particular, the authors in [10] provide a counterexample in
which the tit-for-tat principle is not applicable because the
deviation of a single player from the agreed-upon equilibrium
is invisible to the infinite population due to the negligible
effect, meaning that the deviant player will not be penalized
by other players according to the mean-field equilibrium (i.e.,
a single player can take advantage of other players without
facing any consequences).
In this paper, inspired by [11] and [12], we take a different
route from the above literature and study a game consisting of
an arbitrary number of homogeneous players with finite state
and action spaces under two imperfect information structures:
deep-state sharing and no-sharing, where the deep state refers
to the empirical distribution of the states of a finite population
(rather than that of an infinite one). Since the number of
players is not necessarily large, the simplification afforded by
the negligible effect is not applicable here. We are interested
in index-invariant sequential Nash equilibria and argue that a
sustainable equilibrium in homogeneous games must be index-
invariant (fair) because any index-dependant equilibrium can
cause discrimination against some players that is based on
the way the players are indexed (labeled). This discriminatory
treatment naturally leads to protest and anarchy. It is to be
noted that the mean-field equilibrium is also index-invariant
because every player uses the strategy of a generic player.
Given that players are interested to reach a fair Nash equilib-
rium (agreement), we first analyze the dynamics of the belief
of players under index-invariant strategies, and then identify a
sequential equilibrium by developing a dynamic programming
decomposition under deep-state sharing information structure.
Next, we propose an approximate sequential equilibrium under
no-sharing information structure that converges to the deep-
state sharing (finite-population) solution as the number of
players goes to infinity. In contrast to mean-field games that
compute an infinite-population equilibrium and then impose
some kind of continuity condition on the solution to make it
applicable to the finite-population model, we study a finite-
population model and propose an approximate solution with-
out imposing any continuity assumption on the solution. The
equilibria proposed in this paper are not in the form of
coupled forward-backward equations. This feature allows one
to incorporate feedback information, pertaining to the micro-
scopic as well as macroscopic behaviours, into the equilibria.
Furthermore, unlike the stationary mean-field equilibrium that
assumes the mean-field is stationary and does not change with
time [13], we do not restrict ourselves to stationary mean-field
because the mean-field normally varies with time according to
the dynamics of the players.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
problem is formulated in Section II, and the dynamics of the
deep state is then presented in Section III. An exact solution
under deep state sharing and an approximate one under no-
sharing are proposed in Section IV. The main results are then
extended to the infinite-horizon discounted cost function in
Section V. A numerical example is presented in Section VI,
and the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Notation
In this paper, R, R≥0 and N refer to real, positive real and
natural numbers, respectively. For any k ∈ N, the finite set of
integers {1, . . . , k} is denoted by Nk. Furthermore, P (·) is the
probability of a random variable; E[·] is the expectation of an
event; 1(·) is the indicator function of a set; ‖ ·‖ is the infinity
norm of a vector, and δ(·) is the Dirac measure with a unit
mass concentrated at a single point, specified by the argument.
For any finite set X , En(X ) denotes the space of empirical
distribution of n ∈ N samples form set X , P(X ) denotes
the space of probability measures defined on X , |X | denotes
the cardinality of X , and Conv(A(x),∀x ∈ X ) denotes the
convolution of functions A(x) over all x ∈ X . The short-
hand notation binopdf(n, p) denotes the binomial probability
density function with n ∈ N trails and success probability
p ∈ [0, 1]. Also, the short-hand notation x1:t is used to denote
the set {x1, . . . , xt}. Given a set of n ∈ N components, the
superscript −i is used to represent all components except for
the i-th one, i ∈ Nn.
B. Model
Consider a stochastic dynamic game with n ∈ N homoge-
neous players. Denote by xit ∈ X and uit ∈ U , respectively,
the state and action of player i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ N. Denote
by Dt ∈ En(X × U) the empirical distribution of states and
actions of players at time t and by dt ∈ En(X ) the empirical
distribution of states of players, where for any x ∈ X , u ∈ U
and t ∈ N:
Dt(x, u) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1(xit = x)1(u
i
t = u),
dt(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1(xit = x). (1)
The dynamics of the state of player i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ N is
influenced by other players through the aggregate behavior dt
as follows:
xit+1 = ft(x
i
t, u
i
t, dt, w
i
t), (2)
where wit ∈ W is the local noise of player i at time t.
Each player i ∈ Nn selects action uit ∈ U according to the
probability distribution γit(x
i
t), where γ
i
t : X → P(U). For the
special case of pure strategies, γit(x
i
t) = δ(u
i
t). Alternatively,
the dynamics (2) can be expressed in terms of transition
probability matrix as:
Tt(xit+1, xit, γit(xit), dt) := P
(
xit+1 | xit, γit(xit), dt
)
(3)
=
∑
u∈U
P
(
xit+1 | xit, u, dt
)
γit(x
i
t)(u)
=
∑
u∈U
∑
w∈W
1(xit+1 = ft(x
i
t, u, dt, w))P
(
wit = w
)
γit(x
i
t)(u).
In the sequel, the two equivalent representations (2) and (3)
are occasionally interchanged for ease of display. Let xt :=
{x1t , . . . , xnt }, ut := {u1t , . . . , unt } and wt := {w1t , . . . , wnt },
t ∈ N. It is assumed that the primitive random variables
{x1,w1, . . . ,wT } are defined on a common probability space
and are mutually independent. In addition, X , U and W are
finite sets in the Euclidean space. Furthermore, the initial state
x11, . . . , x
n
1 are i.i.d. random variables with probability mass
function PX , and the local noises w1t , . . . , w
n
t are i.i.d. random
variables with probability mass function PWt , for any t ∈ NT .
C. Admissible strategies
In the sequel, we refer to the empirical distribution of
states as deep state, which is inspired by the fact that its
transition probability matrix resembles a convolutional neural
network [11]. We consider two non-classical information struc-
tures: deep state sharing information structure (DSS) and no-
sharing information structure (NS). In the DSS, every player
has access to its local state and the history of the deep state
at any time t, i.e., action uit ∈ U is selected according to the
following probability distribution:
uit ∼ git(xit, d1:t), i ∈ Nn, t ∈ N, (4)
where git : X ×(En(X ))t → P(U) is the control law at time t.
In practice, there are various applications in which DSS is
plausible. For example, in the stock markets the players (i.e.
buyers, sellers and brokers) are often provided with statistical
data on the total share value with some statistics on trades
and exchanges. Also, in a smart grid, an independent service
operator may collect and broadcast the aggregate demand in
the grid. It is also possible, under certain conditions, to obtain
the deep state without a central authority using a suitable
consensus algorithm. For instance, under some connectivity
conditions, robots in a swarm can obtain the deep state in a
distributed manner by interacting with their neighbours. In the
NS, on the other hand, every player has access only to its local
state at any time instant, i.e.,
uit ∼ git(xit), i ∈ Nn, t ∈ N, (5)
where git : X → P(U). When the number of players is very
large, NS information structure is more practical as it requires
no communication between players after the initial time.
Definition 1 (Index-invariant (fair) strategy). For any i ∈
Nn and t ∈ NT , let Iit denote the information available to
player i by time t. The strategies of players i and j are said
to be index-invariant if git(I
i
t) = g
j
t (σi,jI
j
t ), i, j ∈ Nn, t ∈ NT ,
where git is a generic control law of player i at time t and the
operator σi,j swaps information pertaining to players i and j.
Let gi = {gi1, . . . , giT } denote the strategy of player i ∈ Nn
over the control horizon T ∈ N. For any i ∈ Nn and t ∈ NT ,
let also ct : X × U × En(X × U)→ R≥0 denote the per-step
cost of player i at time t consisting of non-cooperative and
cooperative costs:
ct(x
i
t, u
i
t,Dt) = cnon-cooperative + ccooperative,
where
cnon-cooperative := c˘t(x
i
t, u
i
t, dt),
ccooperative :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
c¯t(x
i
t, u
i
t, dt),
such that c˘t, c¯t : X ×U×En(X )→ R≥0. Define the following
total expected cost for player i ∈ Nn:
J in(g
i,g−i)t0 = E[
T∑
t=t0
ct(x
i
t, u
i
t,Dt)], t0 ∈ NT ,
where the above expectation is taken with respect to the prob-
ability measures induced by the choice of players’ strategies.
Definition 2 (Deep Nash Equilibrium (DNE)). Any strategy
{g∗, . . . ,g∗} under DSS information structure is said to be a
deep Nash equilibrium if for any player i ∈ Nn at any stage
of the game t0 ∈ NT :
J in(g
∗,g∗)t0 ≤ J in(gi,g∗)t0 ,
where gi is any arbitrary DSS strategy.
It is worth highlighting that the solution concept of deep
teams [11] is different from Nash equilibrium, in general.
Definition 3 (Sequential Mean-Field Equilibrium (SMFE)).
Any strategy {g, . . . ,g} under NS information structure is said
to be a sequential mean-field equilibrium if for any player
i ∈ N at any stage of the game t0 ∈ NT :
• It is an infinite-population equilibrium:
J i∞(g,g)t0 ≤ J i∞(gˆi,g)t0 , ∀gˆi.
• Its performance converges to that of a deep Nash equi-
librium asymptotically:
|J in(g,g)t0 − J in(g∗,g∗)t0 | ≤ ε(n)
where ε(n) is a sequence converging to zero as n→∞.
Remark 1. Note that deep Nash equilibrium in Definition 2
is a sequential equilibrium for any arbitrary number of players
(not necessarily large). On the other hand, sequential mean-
field equilibrium in Definition 3 is only meaningful for the case
when the number of players is very large. In general, sequen-
tial mean-field equilibrium is different from the conventional
forward-backward mean-field equilibrium (FBMFE), which is
a non-sequential equilibrium. In particular,
1) SMFE is a sequential equilibrium in the sense that it
takes into account both on- and off-equilibrium-path
events. In contrary, FBMFE is not a sequential one (at
the mean-field level); however, it offers a rather different
setting wherein, for example, the cost can be non-
Markovian with respect to the mean-field [14]. Since
the computational complexity of SMFE and FBMFE are
different, in general, they often have diverse applica-
tions. For instance, SMFE is more desirable for long-
horizon games and reinforcement learning problems (as
the complexity of the solution in the forward-backward
solution increases exponentially with the horizon) while
FBMFE is more suitable for games with large state
spaces (as the complexity of computing the SMFE
increases exponentially with respect to the cardinality
of the state space).
2) SMFE is not necessarily an ε(n)-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
J in(g,g)t0=1  J
i
n(gˆ
i,g)t0=1 + ε(n), ∀gˆi.
This is because of the fact that an infinite-population so-
lution is not necessarily the limit of the finite-population
solution; see a counterexample in [10] that shows the
infinite-population game may admit many meaningful
equilibria (that do not coincide with FBMFE). In gen-
eral, for the SMFE to be an ε(n)-Markov-Nash equi-
librium, not only the model but also the solution must
be continuous with respect to mean-field. On the other
hand, it is often difficult to verify conditions imposed on
the solution because the solution is unknown a priori;
however, for some special cases such as linear quadratic
models [12], the continuity of the solution is shown to
be without loss of optimality.
Problem 1. Find a deep Nash equilibrium (DNE) under DSS
information structure.
Problem 2. Find a sequential mean-field equilibrium (SMFE)
under NS information structure.
D. Main contributions
The main contributions of this paper are outlined below.
1) We present some fundamental properties of finite-
population games with an arbitrary number of homo-
geneous players (not necessarily large), wherein players
wish to find an index-invariant (fair) equilibrium. In
particular, the structure of the transition probability
matrix of the deep-state of the other players is obtained
in Theorem 1 in terms of the convolution function of
some binomial probability distributions, which proves
to be useful for computational purposes.
2) We study the cooperative and non-cooperative games in
a unified framework for both finite and infinite horizon
cases with finite and infinite number of players. In par-
ticular, we identify a sequential equilibrium under DSS
information structure in Theorem 2 and an approximate
sequential equilibrium under NS information structure
in Theorem 3. The proposed results can be extended to
asymmetric cost functions according to Remark 4.
3) We develop two Bellman equations for the infinite-
horizon discounted cost functions in Theorems 4 and 5.
It is to be noted that the approximate equilibrium pro-
posed in Theorem 5 is not stationary because the belief
system varies with time, implying that the standard
stationary assumptions in [13], [15] are rather restrictive.
4) We establish the rate of convergence for both finite-
and infinite-horizon cost functions as the number of
players goes to infinity, without imposing any continuity
assumption on the solution, where the optimality gap is
defined as the distance to the deep Nash equilibrium
rather than the infinite-population equilibrium. In ad-
dition, a quantization scheme is proposed whose cost
of computation converges to zero as the quantization
level increases (Remark 8). Note that the proposed
approximate equilibrium does not necessarily converge
to the conventional mean-field equilibrium since it is not
necessarily continuous with respect to the mean-field.
5) Since our proposed solutions are not future-dependent,
their extension to multiple sub-populations is rather
straightforward compared to multiple sub-population
mean-field games. For example, it is demonstrated
in [16] that the extension of mean-field game approach
to major-minor case is conceptually difficult because the
trajectory of the mean-field of minor players becomes
stochastic due to the randomness of a non-negligible
(major) player, implying that the future is unpredictable.
Such complexity, however, does not arise in our solu-
tions as they are independent of the future decisions.
For more details on the extension to multiple sub-
populations, the reader is referred to a similar argument
presented in deep teams [11].
III. DYNAMICS OF FINITE-POPULATION GAME
Lemma 1. Suppose that players i and j, i, j ∈ Nn, use an
index-invariant strategy. Then, git = g
j
t , t ∈ NT , under DSS
and NS information structures.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Definition 1 and
equations (4) and (5). 
Denote by G the space of all functions with domain X and
range P(U). Suppose that all players except player i ∈ Nn use
an index-invariant DSS strategy. Then, one can decompose the
strategy into local and global control laws as follows:
ψ−it (d1:t) := g
−i
t (·, d1:t, g−i1:t−1, gi1:t−1), γ−it := ψ−it (d1:t),
(6)
for any i ∈ Nn and t ∈ NT . Similarly, for NS information
structure one has:
ψ−it := g
−i
t (·, g−i1:t−1, gi1:t−1), γ−it := ψ−it (·). (7)
The dependence of global laws ψ−it on the past strategies of
players is explicitly displayed in equations (6) and (7). It is to
be noted that although the local control laws γ−it : X → P(U)
under DSS and NS are different, the set G is identical for both
information structures, i.e.,
P
(
ujt | xjt
)
= γ−it (x
j
t ), ∀j ∈ Nn, j 6= i.
Now, on noting that D−it and d
−i
t are the empirical distri-
butions of all players except player i at time t, i.e., for any
x ∈ X and u ∈ U :
D−it (x, u) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i∈Nn
1(xjt = x)1(u
j
t = u),
d−it (x) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i∈Nn
1(xjt = x), (8)
it follows from (1) and (8) that for any i ∈ Nn and t ∈ NT :
n− 1
n
D−it +
1
n
δ(xit, u
i
t) = Dt,
n− 1
n
d−it +
1
n
δ(xit) = dt.
Given any state xit ∈ X of player i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ N, define
functions Qt|xit and Ft|xit for any y, x ∈ X , d˜ ∈ En−1(X ) and
γ ∈ G as follows:
Qt|xit(y, x, d˜, γ) := 1(d˜(x) = 0)δ(0) + 1(d˜(x) > 0)
×binopdf((n− 1)d˜(x), Tt(y, x, γ(x), n−1n d˜+ 1nδ(xit))),
Ft|xit(y, d˜, γ) := Conv(Qt|xit(y, x, d˜, γ),∀x ∈ X ),
where Qt|xit : X 2×En−1(X )×G → P(0, 1, . . . , (n−1)d˜(x))
and Ft|xit : X × En−1(X )× G → P(0, 1, . . . , n− 1).
Theorem 1. If all players except player i ∈ Nn use the local
law γ−it ∈ G under DSS or NS information structure at time
t ∈ NT , then the transition probability matrix of their deep
state for any y ∈ X and k ∈ Nn is given by:
P(d−it+1(y) =
k − 1
n− 1 | x
i
t, d
−i
t , γ
−i
t ) = Ft|xit(y, d
−i
t , γ
−i
t )(k).
In addition,
E[d−it+1(y) | xit, d−it , γ−it ] =
∑
x∈X
d−it (x)
× Tt(y, x, γ−it (x),
n− 1
n
d−it +
1
n
δ(xit)). (9)
Proof. It follows from (8) that for every y ∈ X ,
(n− 1)d−it+1(y) =
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
1(xjt+1 = y)
=
∑
x∈X
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
1(xjt = x)1(ft(x, γ
−i
t (x), dt, w
j
t ) = y). (10)
For any x ∈ X , the inner summation in right-hand side of (10)
consists of (n − 1) components, where (n − 1)(1 − d−it (x))
components are zero due to the fact that there are only (n−
1)d−it (x) components that have state x at time t, according
to the definition of the empirical distribution d−it (x). These
(n−1) possibly non-zero components are independent binary
random variables with the following success probability:
P(1(ft(x, γ
−i
t (x), dt, w
j
t ) = y) = 1) = Tt(y, x, γ−it (x), dt).
Let Ft|xit(y, d
−i
t , γ
−i
t ) denote the probability mass function
(PMF) of the sum of these (n − 1)d−it (x) Bernoulli random
variables, which is a binomial distribution with (n−1)d−it (x)
trials and success probability Tt(y, x, γ−it (x), n−1n d−it +
1
nδ(x
i
t)). Now, the PMF of (n − 1)d−it+1(y) is the PMF of
the outer summation in the right-hand side of equation (10)
that consists of |X | independent random variables, each of
which has the PMF Qt|xit(y, x, d
−i
t , γ
−i
t ). Therefore, the PMF
of (n− 1)d−it+1(y) can be expressed as the convolution of the
PMFs Qt|xit(y, x, d
−i
t , γ
−i
t ) over space X .
In addition, it follows from (1), (3) and (8) that for every
y ∈ X and t ∈ NT :
E[d−it+1(y) | xit, d−it , γ−it ] = E[
1
n
n∑
i=1
1(xit+1 = y) | xit, d−it , γ−it ]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[1(xit+1 = y) | xit, d−it , γ−it ] =
∑
x∈X
d−it (x)
× Tt(y, x, γ−it (x),
n− 1
n
d−it +
1
n
δ(xit)),
where the states of all players except that of player i has
identical transition probability. 
Lemma 2. If all players except player i ∈ Nn use a fair strat-
egy under the DSS and NS, the following holds irrespective of
the strategy gi at any time t ∈ NT ,
P
(
xit+1, dt+1 | xi1:t, d1:t, γi1:t, γ−i1:t
)
= P
(
xit+1 | xit, γit(xit), dt
)
P
(
d−it+1 | xit, d−it , γ−it
)
.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 8 and equations (2), (3)
and (8). 
Lemma 3. Suppose all players except player i ∈ Nn use a
local law γ−it ∈ G at time t ∈ NT . Then, the following holds
for any i, k ∈ Nn, t ∈ NT , x ∈ X and u ∈ U:
P
(
D−it (x, u) =
k − 1
n− 1 | x
i
1:t, d
−i
1:t, γ
i
1:t, γ
−i
1:t
)
= binopdf((n− 1)d−it (x), γ−it (x)(u))(k),
and
E[D−it (x, u) | xi1:t, d−i1:t, γi1:t, γ−i1:t ] = d−it (x)γ−it (x)(u). (11)
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix A. 
Lemma 4. Suppose all players except player i ∈ Nn use a
local law γ−it ∈ G at time t ∈ NT . There exists a function
`t : X × En(X ) × P(U) × G :→ R≥0 such that the per-step
cost function of player i can be expressed as follows:
E[ct(x
i
t, u
i
t,Dt) | xi1:t, d1:t, γi1:t, γ−i1:t ]
=
∑
u,D−i
ct(x
i
t, u,
n− 1
n
D−i +
1
n
δ(xit, u))γ
i
t(x
i
t)(u)
× P (D−it = D−i | d−it , γ−it ) =: `t(xit, dt, γit(xit), γ−it ).
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 3, equation (8) and
the fact that uit is distributed according to the probability
distribution γit(x
i
t). 
In the next lemma, it is shown that the belief of every player
can be characterized by the deep state of other players.
Lemma 5. Let all players except player i ∈ Nn use the
local law γ−it ∈ G at time t ∈ NT . Then, under DSS or
NS information structure, irrespective of the strategies of the
players, the following relation holds:
P
(
x−it | xi1:t, d−i1:t, γi1:t, γ−i1:t
)
= P
(
x−it | d−it
)
. (12)
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix B. 
The following lemma is a consequence of the above result.
Lemma 6. If all players except player i ∈ Nn use the local
law γ−it ∈ G at time t, then there exists a function `t : X ×
En(X ) × P(U) × G → R≥0 such that for any arbitrarily-
coupled cost function ct(xit, u
i
t,xt,ut) : X ×U ×Xn×Un →
R≥0,
E[ct(x
i
t, u
i
t,xt,ut) | xi1:t, d1:t, γi1:t, γ−i1:t ] =: `t(xit, dt, γit(xit), γ−it ).
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix C. 
Remark 2. Note that d−it is not necessarily a Markov process,
i.e. P
(
d−it+1|d−i1:t, γ−i1:t
) 6= P (d−it+1|d−it , γ−it ). When n = ∞,
however, the above inequality becomes equality due to the
negligible effect.
Remark 3. Note that the results of Theorem 1 and Lemmas 2–
6 hold irrespective of control laws gi1:t and ψ
−i
1:t, t ∈ NT .
IV. FINITE HORIZON
A. Solution of Problem 1
Define value functions VT+1, VT , . . . , V1 such that for any
(xiT+1, dT+1) ∈ X ×En(X ), VT+1(xiT+1, dT+1) = 0, and for
any t ∈ NT and (xit, dt) ∈ X × En(X ),
Vt(x
i
t, dt) = min
γit(x
i
t)∈P(U)
(`t(x
i
t, dt, γ
i
t(x
i
t), γ
−i
t )
+ E[Vt+1(x
i
t+1, dt+1) | xit, dt, γit(xit), γ−it ]), (13)
where `t is given by Lemma 4 and γ−it is the local law of all
players except player i at time t.
Lemma 7. If all players except player i ∈ Nn use the same
DSS strategy, then the best-response strategy for player i is
obtained from dynamic program (13).
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that the stochastic
process (xit+1, dt+1) evolves in a Markovian manner under
γit(x
i
t) and γ
−i
t , according to Lemma 2. In addition, from
Lemma 4, it follows that the expected per-step cost of player i
at time t can be described by `t(xit, dt, γ
i
t(x
i
t), γ
−i
t ). Since the
results of Lemmas 2 and 4 do not depend on gi1:t and ψ
−i
1:t,
(xit, dt) is an information state for player i. Subsequently, one
can write the dynamic program (13) in order to find the best-
response strategy of player i. 
Remark 4. According to Lemma 6, dynamic programming de-
composition proposed in Lemma 7 extends to any arbitrarily-
coupled (asymmetric) cost function.
In the next theorem, it is shown that deep Nash equilibrium
always exists.
Theorem 2. Problem 1 always admits an index-invariant
solution that satisfies the best-response equation (13) across
all players, simultaneously.
Proof. For ease of display, we present the best-response equa-
tion (13) as follows:
γit = Bt(dt)(γ
−i
t ), (14)
where for any t ∈ NT and dt ∈ En(X ), Bt(dt) : G → G, i.e.,
Bt(dt) := argmin
γit(·)
(`t(·, dt, γit(·), γ−it )
+ E[Vt+1(x
i
t+1, dt+1) | ·, dt, γit(·), γ−it ]).
We now show that equation (14) admits at least one index-
invariant fixed-point solution at each time t ∈ NT , i.e., γt :=
γit = γ
−i
t . At any time t ∈ NT , given any xit, dt and γ−it , the
solution of equation (13) can be expressed as follows:
argmin
γit(x
i
t)
`t(x
i
t, dt, γ
i
t(x
i
t), γ
−i
t )
+
∑
xit+1,dt+1
P
(
xit+1, dt+1 | xit, dt, γit(xit), γ−it
)
Vt+1(x
i
t+1, dt+1)
(a)
= argmin
γit(x
i
t)
`t(x
i
t, dt, γ
i
t(x
i
t), γ
−i
t )
+
∑
xit+1,d
−i
t+1
[∑
u
P
(
xit+1 | xit, u, dt
)
γit(x
i
t)(u)
]
× P (d−it+1 | d−it , γ−it )Vt+1(xit+1, n− 1n d−it+1 + 1nδ(xit+1)),
where (a) follows from Lemma 2 and equations (3) and (8).
Note that the argument of the above equation is piece-wise
linear in γit(x
i
t) due to Lemma 4. Hence, the minimization
problem is a convex optimization, i.e., Bt(dt)(γ−it ) is a non-
empty and convex set. In addition, Bt(dt)(·) is a closed graph
because it is continuous with respect to γ−it according to
Theorem 1 and Lemmas 3 and 4, on noting that binomial
probability distribution is continuous with respect to the
success probability. Since G is a non-empty, compact and
convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space, the set-
valued mapping B has a fixed-point solution [17, Chapter 17].
This means that there exists a local law γt ∈ G such that:
γt = Bt(dt)(γt). 
In the view of Theorem 2, we remove the subscript i
in the sequel because the deep Nash equilibrium, identified
by the dynamic program (13), is index-invariant. Note that
the equilibrium still depends on the number of players n.
Consequently, we define a generic player with the same
dynamics and per-step cost as any individual player, which
competes against n − 1 identical players of its own kind.
Let xt ∈ X and γt ∈ G denote the state and local law
of the generic player at time t ∈ NT , respectively, and
define the value functions VT+1, VT , . . . , V1 such that for any
(xT+1, dT+1) ∈ X ×En(X ), VT+1(xT+1, dT+1) = 0, and for
any t ∈ NT and (xt, dt) ∈ X × En(X ),
Vt(xt, dt) = min
γt(xt)∈P(U)
(`t(xt, dt, γt(xt), γt)
+ E[Vt+1(xt+1, dt+1) | xt, dt, γt(xt), γt]). (15)
Infinite population: A special case
Consider a special case in which the number of players is
infinite, i.e. n = ∞. In this case, deep state dt ∈ En(X )
reduces to mean field mt ∈ P(X ), t ∈ NT , where the average
of any infinite number of i.i.d. binary random variables is equal
to their expectation, almost surely, according to the strong law
of large numbers. Consequently, the dynamics of the deep state
can be simplified for n = ∞, according to (9). In particular,
define a vector-valued function fˆt : P(X ) × G → P(X ), t ∈
NT , such that for any m ∈ P(X ) and γ ∈ G,
fˆt(m, γ) :=
∑
x∈X
m(x)Tt(·, x, γ(x),m), (16)
where m1 := PX , and for any t ∈ NT : mt+1 := fˆt(mt, γt).
In addition, from Lemma 4 and equations (8) and (11), define
the infinite-population per-step cost function ˆ`t : X ×P(X )×
P(U)× G at time t ∈ NT as follows:{
ˆ`
t(xt,mt, γt(x), γt) :=
∑
u∈U ct(xt, u,Mt)γt(x)(u),
Mt(x, u) := mt(x)γt(x)(u), x ∈ X , u ∈ U ,
(17)
where Mt ∈ P(X × U) denotes the infinite-population
Dt ∈ E∞(X × U). Finally, define value functions
VˆT+1, VˆT , . . . , Vˆ1 such that for any (xT+1,mT+1) ∈ X ×
P(X ), VˆT+1(xT+1,mT+1) = 0, and for any t ∈ NT and
(xt,mt) ∈ X × P(X ),
Vˆt(xt,mt) = min
γt(xt)∈P(U)
(ˆ`t(xt,mt, γt(x), γt)
+ E[Vˆt+1(xt+1,mt+1) | xt,mt, γt(x), γt]). (18)
Corollary 1. Given any mean-field mt ∈ P(X ) at any time
t ∈ NT , the fixed-point equation (18) always has a solution.
Proof. The proof follows along the same steps of the proof of
Theorem 2, where deep state dt simplifies to mean field mt
with the dynamics (16) and cost (17). 
Remark 5. In mean-field games [5], [6], [18], mean-field
refers to the infinite-population limit of the deep state (i.e.
E[dt] = mt) and in mean-field-type game [19]–[22], it refers
to the probability distribution of the state of the generic player
(i.e., E[dt] = P (xt)). Note that the solution concept of the
mean-field-type game is generally different from Nash equilib-
rium, because mt 6= P (xt). For the cooperative cost function
with decoupled dynamics, [23] proposes some convexity con-
ditions under which the infinite-population cooperative (Nash
bargaining) solution coincides with the team-optimal solution.
For the special case of linear quadratic games, the reader
is referred to [12] for similarities and differences between
mean-field games [24], mean-field-type games [25] and deep
teams [26].
B. Solution of Problem 2
To propose an approximate solution for Problem 2, we make
the following mild assumption on the model.
Assumption 1. There exist constants Kpt ,Kct ∈ R≥0, t ∈ NT ,
(that do not depend on n) such that for every x, y ∈ X , u ∈ U ,
d,m ∈ P(X ) and D,M ∈ P(X × U),
|P (y|x, u, d)− P (y|x, u,m) | ≤ Kpt ‖d−m‖,
|ct(x, u,D)− ct(x, u,M)| ≤ Kct ‖D−M‖.
Remark 6. Note that Assumption 1 is not much restrictive,
and holds for any function that is polynomial in d and D due to
the fact that they are confined to the bounded domains P(X )
and P(X × U), respectively. Furthermore, any continuous
function can be approximated by polynomial functions as
closely as desirable according to Weierstrass Theorem.
Denote by st(xt,mt) ∈ P(U), t ∈ NT , a solution of the
fixed-point equation (18). Define the following NS strategy:
γt = st(·,mt), t ∈ NT , (19)
where m1 = PX , and for any t ∈ NT ,
mt+1 = fˆt(mt, st(·,mt)). (20)
Remark 7. It is to be noted that given the strategy s1:T and
probability mass function of initial states PX , m1:T can be
calculated by every player independently, according to (20).
In addition, if the players happen to commonly change their
belief about the mean-field at any stage of the game, the
dynamics of the belief system (20) can accommodate this
trembling-hand effect as the control law st is in the state-
feedback form.
Lemma 8. Let Assumption 1 hold. Let also dt ∈ En(X ),
Dt ∈ E(X × U), mt ∈ P(X ) and Mt ∈ P(X × U) be
controlled by the same local control law γt ∈ G. Then, there
exists a constant Kmt ∈ R≥0 such that at any time t ∈ NT :
E[‖dt+1 −mt+1‖] ≤ Kmt ‖dt −mt‖+O(
1√
n
),
E[‖Dt+1 −Mt+1‖] ≤ Kmt ‖dt −mt‖+O(
1√
n
),
where O( 1√
n
) does not depend on the control horizon T .
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix D. 
Lemma 9. Let Assumption 1 hold. For any x ∈ X , γ(x) ∈ G,
m ∈ P(X ) and t ∈ NT , one has: `t(x,m, γ(x), γ) ≤ Kct .
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 4, Assumption 1 and
the fact that spaces X and U are finite and ‖D − M‖ ≤
1,∀D,M ∈ P(X × U). 
Define the following non-negative constants backward in
time such that for any t ∈ NT :
Kvt := K
c
t +K
v
t+1K
m
t +K
p
t
t+1∑
τ=1
βτ−1Kcτ ,
Kot := K
v
t+1 +K
o
t+1, (21)
where KvT+1 = K
o
T+1 = 0.
Lemma 10. Let Assumption 1 hold. For any x ∈ X , dt ∈
En(X ), mt ∈ P(X ) and t ∈ NT , the following inequality
holds:
|Vt(x, dt)− Vˆt(x,mt)| ≤ Kvt ‖dt −mt‖+KotO(
1√
n
), (22)
where O( 1√
n
) does not depend on the control horizon T .
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix E. 
Let xˆt and dˆt denote the state and deep-state of the generic
player at time t ∈ NT under the proposed NS strategy (19).
Lemma 11. Let Assumption 1 hold. Given any dˆt ∈ En(X )
and mt ∈ P(X ), t ∈ NT , the following inequality holds:
|E[
t∑
τ=1
∑
u
ct(xˆt, u, Dˆt)st(xˆt,mt)(u)]− E[
t∑
τ=1
∑
u
ct(xt, u,Mt)
×st(xt,mt)(u)]| ≤ Kvt ‖dˆt −mt‖+KotO(
1√
n
).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 10, on
noting that Dt and Mt are governed by the same control law
st(·,mt), t ∈ NT . 
Theorem 3. Let Assumption 1 hold, and also equations (15)
and (18) admit a unique solution. Then, {st(·,mt),mt}Tt=1
is a solution of Problem 2, i.e. |J∗n − Jˆn| ∈ O( 1√n ), where
J∗n and Jˆn are the performance values of the generic player
under the solutions satisfying (15) and (18), respectively.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix F. 
Remark 8. It is to be noted that the dynamic program (18)
may involve a non-smooth non-convex optimization over
P(X ), which is an uncountably infinite set. To overcome this
hurdle, one may replace P(X ) by a finite (quantized) space
similar to that proposed in [27, Corollary 1] and [11, Theorems
4 and 5]. An immediate implication is that if the quantization
level is
√
n, the resultant quantization solution converges to
the sequential mean-field equilibrium at the same that the
unquantized solution does (i.e. 1/
√
n).
V. INFINITE HORIZON
In this section, we extend our main results to the infinite
horizon discounted cost. To this end, it is assumed that the
model described in Section II is time-homogeneous; hence, the
subscript t is omitted from the notation. Denote by β ∈ (0, 1)
the discount factor and by J i,βn the total expected discounted
cost for player i ∈ Nn, i.e.
J i,βn := E[
∞∑
t=1
βt−1c(xit, u
i
t,Dt)].
Define also the infinite-horizon counterpart of Bellman equa-
tion (15) such that for any (x, d) ∈ X × En(X ),
V (x, d) = min
γ(x)∈P(U)
(`(x, d, γ(x), γ)
+ β
∑
x+∈X ,d+∈En(X )
P
(
x+, d+|x, d, γ)V (x+, d+). (23)
Theorem 4. The Bellman equation (23) admits a solution, and
that solution is a sequential equilibrium for the infinite-horizon
discounted cost function under DSS information structure.
Proof. From Lemma 7, the best response strategy of any
player i ∈ Nn is given by (13) for any finite horizon T ∈ N.
Define a real-valued function W it for any i ∈ Nn and t ∈ NT ,
(x, d) ∈ X × En(X ) as follows:
W it (x, d) := β
−T+t−1V iT−t+2(x, d), (24)
where W i1(x, d) := β
−TV iT+1(x, d) = 0. It can be shown that:
W iT+1(x
i, d) = min
γi(xi)∈P(U)
(`(xi, d, γi(xi), γ−i)
+β
∑
xi,+∈X ,d+∈En(X )
P
(
xi,+, d+|x, d, γ(xi), γ−i)WT (xi,+, d+)),
(25)
where W iT+1(x
i, d) = V i1 (x
i, d). For any T ∈ N and d ∈
En(X ), define the best-response function BT (d) : G → G,
i.e.,
BT (d) := argmin
γi(·)
(`(·, d, γi(·), γ−i)
+ β
∑
xi,+∈X ,d+∈En(X )
P
(
xi,+, d+|·, d, γi(·), γ−i)WT (xi,+, d+)).
Given any xi, d and γ−i, the solution of equation (25) can be
expressed as follows:
argmin
γi(xi)
`(xi, d, γi(xi), γ−i)
+ β
∑
xi,+,d−i,+
[∑
u
P
(
xi,+ | xi, u, d) γi(xi)(u)]
× P (d−i,+ | d−i, γ−i)WT (xi,+, n− 1
n
d−i,+ +
1
n
δ(xi,+)).
From Lemma 4, it results that the argument of the above
equation is piece-wise linear in γi(xi); hence, the above
minimization is a convex optimization, i.e., BT (d)(γ−i) is
a non-empty and convex set. In addition, BT (d)(·) is a
closed graph because it is continuous with respect to γ−i
according to Theorem 1 and Lemmas 3 and 4, on noting that
binomial probability distribution is continuous with respect
to its success probability. Since G is a non-empty, compact
and convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space, the
set-valued mapping B has a fixed-point solution [17, Chapter
17]. This means that there exists a local law γ ∈ G such that:
γ = BT (d)(γ).
On the other hand, since the discount factor β is less than
one, the Bellman equation (25) is a contractive mapping with
respect to the infinity norm, implying that (25) converges to a
solution, i.e., for every (x, d) ∈ X × En(X ),
lim
T→∞
WT+1(x, d) = W∞(x, d) =: V (x, d). (26)

For any x ∈ X and m ∈ P(X ), define the infinite-horizon
counterpart of the dynamic program (18) as:
Vˆ (x,m) = min
γ(x)∈P(U)
(`(x,m, γ(x), γ)
+ β
∑
x+∈X
P
(
x+|x, γ(x),m)V (x+, fˆ(m, γ))). (27)
Denote by s(x,m) any solution of the fixed point equa-
tion (27), and define the following NS strategy:
γit = s(x
i
t,mt), i ∈ Nn, t ∈ N, (28)
where m1 = PX , and for any t ∈ N, mt+1 = fˆ(mt, s(·,mt)).
Remark 9. Note that strategy (28) is not stationary with
respect to the local state as the process {mt}∞t=1 has dynamics.
Assumption 2. Let βKm < 1, where Km is given by
Lemma 8.
Lemma 12. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Given any x ∈ X ,
d1 ∈ En(X ) and m1 ∈ P(X ), the relative distance |V (x, d1)−
Vˆ (x,m1)| is upper bounded by:
|V (x, d1)− Vˆ (x,m1)| ≤ (1− β +K
p)Kc
1− βKm ‖d1 −m1‖
+
1− β +Kp
(1− β)
Kc
1− βKmO(
1√
n
).
Proof. Given the dynamic program (18) and any finite horizon
T ∈ N, define the non-negative real-valued function Wˆt(x,m)
for any x ∈ X , m ∈ P(X ) and t ∈ NT as follows:
Wˆt(x,m) := β
−T+t−1VˆT−t+2(x,m), (29)
where Wˆ1(x,m) := β−T VˆT+1(x,m) = 0. Then, one can ob-
tain the following equality by simple algebraic manipulations:
WˆT+1(x,m) = min
γ(x)∈P(X )
(`(x,m, γ(x), γ)+
β
∑
x+∈X
P (x˜|x, γ(x),m) WˆT (x+, fˆ(m, γ))), (30)
where WˆT+1(x,m) = Vˆ1(x,m). Since (30) is contractive, it
admits a unique solution for any (x,m) ∈ X × P(X ), i.e.
lim
T→∞
WˆT+1(x,m) = Wˆ∞(x,m) =: Vˆ (x,m). (31)
Now, define the following constants based on the ones given
in (21):
Kˆvt := β
−T+t−1KvT−t+2, Kˆ
o
t := β
−T+t−1KoT−t+2, (32)
where Kˆv1 := β
−TKvT+1 = 0 and Kˆ
o
1 := β
−TKoT+1 = 0. It
is straightforward to show that:
Kv1 = Kˆ
v
T+1 = K
c + βKˆvTK
z +Kp
∑2
τ=1 β
τ−1Kc
≤ Kc(1 + 11−βKp) + βKmKˆvT ,
Ko1 = Kˆ
o
T+1 = β(Kˆ
v
T + Kˆ
o
T ) =
∑T
τ=1 β
T−τ+1Kˆvτ
≤ KˆvT
∑T
τ=1 β
T−τ+1.
(33)
From Lemma 10 and equations (24), (29) and (32), for any
T ∈ N, the following inequality holds:
|WT+1(x, d1)− WˆT+1(x,m1)| = |V1(x, d1)− Vˆ1(x,m1)|
≤ KˆvT+1‖d1 −m1‖+ KˆoT+1O(
1√
n
). (34)
From Assumption 2 and equations (26), (31), (33) and (34),
when T →∞ the following inequality is obtained: |V (x, d1)−
Vˆ (x,m1)| ≤ Kˆv∞‖d1 −m1‖+ Kˆo∞O( 1√n ). 
Let xˆt and dˆt denote, respectively, the state and deep-state
of the generic player at time t ∈ NT under the proposed
NS strategy (28), where xˆ1 = x1 and dˆ1 = d1. Then, the
performance of the player is given by
Jˆβn := E[
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
∑
u∈U
c(xˆt, u, dˆt)s(xˆt,mt)(u)].
Theorem 5. Let Assumptions 1–2 hold, and the Bellman
equations (23) and (27) admit a unique solution. Then,
{s(·,mt),mt}∞t=1 is a solution of Problem 2 with the infinite-
horizon discounted cost function such that
|J∗,βn − Jˆβn | ≤
(2− β)(1− β +Kp)
1− β
Kc
1− βKmO(
1√
n
),
where J∗,βn and Jˆ
β
n are the performance values of the generic
player under the solutions satisfying (23) and (27), respec-
tively.
Proof. From the triangle inequality, it results that
|J∗,βn − Jˆβn | ≤ |J∗,βn − E[Vˆ (x1, z1)]|+ |Jˆβn − E[Vˆ (x1, z1)]|.
(35)
The first term of the right-hand side of (35) is bounded
by O( 1√
n
) according to Lemma 12, the monotonicity of
the expectation operator, the relation J∗βn = E[V (x1, d1)],
and the fact that m1 converges to m1 = PX at the rate
O( 1n ) in the mean-square sense. The second term of the
right-hand side of (35) is also bounded by a similar bound
O( 1√
n
). The existence of an index-invariant strategy for (27)
can be established following similar steps in Theorem 4 and
Corollary 1. The proof is now completed, on noting that
O( 1√
n
) +O( 1√
n
) = O( 1√
n
). 
Corollary 2. The result of Theorem 5 holds irrespective of
Assumption 2 if the dynamics of the players are decoupled.
Proof. he proof follows from the fact that when the dynamics
of players are decoupled, Km = 1 in Lemma 8 and Kp = 0
in Assumption 1. 
Remark 10. Similar to Remark 8, one can use a quantized
space for the infinite-horizon cost function wherein the quan-
tization error is upper bounded by the constant proposed in
Theorem 5.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Example 1. Consider n players (n ∈ N) sharing a common
resource, e.g., a communication channel. Each player inde-
pendently makes a request with probability p ∈ (0, 1) to have
access to the resource at any time t ∈ N. Let q ∈ (0, 1)
denote the probability according to which a request is served.
If a player has a pending request, it is not allowed to send
another request until its current request is served. Denote by
xit ∈ {0, 1} the state of player i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ N, where
xit = 1 means that player i has a request at time t and x
i
t = 0
means it has no request.
The common resource is provided by a third-party company
whose profit depends on the number of requests (the higher
number of requests the more profit). Let α ∈ Nn denote a
threshold above which the company makes a reasonable profit,
and if the number of requests is less than α, each player has
to pay a fee cunderload ∈ R>0. On the other hand, when the
number of requests is larger than a threshold γ ∈ Nn, players
may experience some discomfort such as delay in accessing
the resource. Denote by coverload ∈ R>0 the cost associated
with an overload of requests. At each time instant, there are
three options available to players: (1) everyone sends a request
without any commitment to others; (2) everyone commits to
decrease the number of requests, and (3) everyone commits
to increase the number of requests. Denote by uit the action
of player i at time t, and let uit = 1, 2, 3 be respectively the
action corresponding to the options (1)–(3) described above.
The transition probability of each player i ∈ Nn under action
uit = 1 is given by
P
(
xit+1 | xit, uit = 1
)
=
[
1− p p
q 1− q
]
.
Let pD ≤ p denote the probability of request when players
agree to decrease the number of requests. In such a case,
players with pending requests drop them with some proba-
bility. Let qD ≥ q denote the probability that a request is not
pending (either served or dropped). Therefore, the transition
probability of player i under action uit = 2 is described by
P
(
xit+1 | xit, uit = 2
)
=
[
1− pD pD
qD 1− qD
]
.
Denote by pI ≥ p the probability of request when players
agree to increase the number of requests. Hence, the transition
probability of player i under action uit = 3 is expressed by
P
(
xit+1 | xit, uit = 3
)
=
[
1− pI pI
q 1− q
]
.
Since the state space is binary, the empirical distribution of one
state is sufficient to identify that of the other state. Hence,
with a slight abuse of notation, denote dt as the empirical
distribution of the requests of all players at time t ∈ N, i.e.
dt =
1
n
∑
i∈Nn
1(xit = 1).
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Fig. 1. A trajectory of the number of requests in Example 1, given 20 different
initial states.
If player i wishes to selfishly use the shared resource without
taking the states of other players into account, others can
penalize that player by sending either a small number of
requests resulting in cunderload or a large number of requests
leading to coverload as follows:
c(xit, d
−i
t ) =
{
cunderload, (n− 1)d−it < α− xit,
coverload, (n− 1)d−it ≥ γ − xit.
Given a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), define
J i,βn = E[
∞∑
t=1
βt−1c(xit, d
−i
t )].
For the sake of transparency, the company announces the
empirical distribution of requests at each time instant, i.e.,
the information structure is deep-state sharing. The objective
of the players is to reach a fair agreement (Nash strategy)
among themselves to efficiently utilize the shared resource.
Figure 1 displays a Nash strategy for the following numerical
parameters:
n = 100, p = 0.3, q = 0.3, pD = 0.2, qD = 0.4, pI = 0.4,
β = 0.9, α = 30, γ = 70, cunderload = 5, coverload = 1.
The decision of each player i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ N depends on
the local state xit and the empirical distribution of the requests
of other players d−it . It is shown in Figure 1 that the trajectory
of the number of requests of players lies between the lower
and upper bounds for different initial states.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a game consisting of a set of homogeneous
players wishing to reach an index-invariant (fair) Nash equi-
librium was studied. The players were modeled as controlled
Markov chains, where their dynamics and cost functions
were coupled through the empirical distribution of their states
(deep state). Two non-classical information structures, namely
deep-state sharing and no-sharing information structures, were
investigated. Since the number of players was finite (and not
necessarily large), the effect of a single player on other players
was non-negligible and the deep state was a random vector
(rather than a deterministic one). A sequential equilibrium was
identified under the deep-state sharing information structure
and an approximate one was proposed under the no-sharing
structure for both finite- and infinite-horizon cost functions.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
From equation (8), one has:
(n− 1)D−it (x, u) =
n∑
j 6=i
1(xit = x)1(u
i
t = u),
where the above equation consists of (n − 1)d−it (x) binary
random variables with success probability γ−it (x)(u). In ad-
dition, the following holds:
E[(n− 1)D−it (x, u)] = (n− 1)d−it (x)γ−it (x)(u),
where (n−1)D−it (x, u) has Binomial probability distribution.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The proof follows from the fact that the conditional
probability (12) is invariant to the permutation of the
other players. More precisely, the primitive random vari-
ables, dynamics and control laws of the other play-
ers are exchangeable, which means that all permuta-
tions are equally likely to happen. Therefore, the con-
ditional probability (12) is exchangeable, i.e., for any
j, k ∈ Nn, j, k 6= i: P
(
σj,kx
−i
t | xi1:t, d−i1:t, γi1:t, γ−i1:t
)
=
P
(
x−it | xi1:t, d−i1:t, γi1:t, γ−i1:t
)
. Hence, the above conditional
probability is representable by d−it , i.e., it is equal to zero
if the empirical distribution of x−it is not d
−i
t , and it is equal
to 1/H(d−it ) otherwise, where H(d
−i
t ) is the number of all
realizations of x−it whose empirical distribution is d
−i
t . Note
that function H is independent of the strategies of players.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
The proof follows from Lemma 5 such that:
E[ct(x
i
t, u
i
t,xt,ut) | xi1:t, d1:t, γi1:t, γ−i1:t ]
=
∑
x−it
∑
u−it
[∑
u∈U
ct(x
i
t, u,xt,ut)γ
i
t(x
i
t)(u)
]
× P (x−it ,u−it | xi1:t, d−i1:t, γi1:t, γ−i1:t)
=
∑
x−it
∑
u−it
[∑
u∈U
ct(x
i
t, u,xt,ut)γ
i
t(x
i
t)(u)
]
× P (x−it | xi1:t, d−i1:t, ui1:t, γ−i1:t) n∏
j 6=i
γ−it (x
j
t )(u
j
t )
(a)
=:`t(x
i
t, dt, γ
i
t , γ
−i
t ),
where (a) follows from equation (8).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
The proof follows from the triangle inequity and the fact
that empirical distribution converges to the expectation at the
rate O( 1√
n
) in the mean-square sense. In particular,
E[‖dt+1 −mt+1‖] ≤ E‖E[dt+1]−mt+1‖+ E‖dt+1 − E[dt+1]‖
(a)
= E‖fˆt(dt, γt)− fˆt(mt, γt)‖+ E‖dt+1 − E[dt+1]‖
(b)
≤K
m
t ‖dt −mt‖+O(
1√
n
),
(36)
where (a) follows from the the fact that for any y ∈ X ,
E[dt+1(y)|dt, γt] = E[
n∑
i=1
1(xit+1 = y) | dt, γt]
=
∑
x∈X
dt(x)P
(
xit+1 = y|xit = x, γit(x) = γt(x), dt
)
=
∑
x∈X
dt(x)Tt(y, x, γt(x), dt) = fˆt(dt, γt))(y),
and (b) follows from [27, Lemmas 1 and 2]. In addition, for
any x ∈ X and u ∈ U ,
E|Dt+1(x, u)−Mt+1(x, u)| ≤ E|E[Dt+1(x, u)]−Mt+1(x, u)|
+E|Dt+1(x, u)− E[Dt+1(x, u)]|
(c)
= E[dt+1(x)γ(x)(u)−mt+1(x)γ(x)(u)] +O(
1√
n
)
(d)
≤K
m
t ‖dt −mt‖+O(
1√
n
),
where (c) follows from Lemma 3 and (d) follows from (36).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 10
For ease of display, let D˜t := nn−1Dt +
1
n−1δ(xt), t ∈ NT .
The proof follows from a backward induction and equa-
tion (15) such that at the terminal time t = T and any state
x ∈ X , one has:
VT (x, dT ) = min
γT (x)
`T (x, dT , γT (x), γT )
= min
γT (x)
E[cT (x, uT ,DT ) | x, dT , γT (x), γT ]
= min
γT (x)
ED˜T [
∑
u∈U
cT (x, u,
n− 1
n
D˜T +
1
n
δ(x, u))γT (x)(u)]
(a)
≤ min
γT (x)
ED˜T [
∑
u∈U
cT (x, u,
n− 1
n
D−iT +
1
n
δ(x, u))γT (x)(u)
−
∑
u∈U
cT (x, u,MT )γT (x)(u)]
+ ED˜T [
∑
u∈U
cT (x, u,MT )γT (x)(u)]
(b)
≤E[‖
n− 1
n
D−iT −MT ‖] +
1
n
+ min
γT (x)
∑
u∈U
cT (x, u,MT )γT (x)(u)
(c)
=K
c
T ‖dT −mT ‖+O(
1√
n
) + Vˆt(xT ,mT ),
where (a) follows from the triangle inequality, per-step cost
being non-negative (by definition), and the monotonicity of
the minimum operator; (b) follows from Assumption 1, equa-
tion (17) and the monotonicity of the minimum operator, and
(c) follows from (18). Assume now that inequality (22) holds
at time t+ 1 for any x ∈ X , i.e.,
|Vt+1(x, dt+1)− Vˆt+1(x,mt+1)| ≤ Kvt+1‖dt+1 −mt+1‖
+Kot+1O(
1√
n
). (37)
The objective is to show that it holds at time t as well. It
follows from (15) that for any xt ∈ X ,
Vt(xt, dt) = min
γt(xt)
(`t(xt, dt, γt(xt), γt) + E[Vt+1(xt+1, dt+1)])
= min
γt(xt)
(`t(xt, dt, γt(xt), γt)± `t(xt,mt, γt(xt), γt)
+ ED˜t+1 [
∑
xt+1
At(Ct −Dt) + (At −Bt)Dt +BtDt]),
(38)
where
At := P (xt+1 | xt, dt, γt(xt)) ,
Bt := P (xt+1 | xt,mt, γt(xt)) ,
Ct := Vt+1(xt+1, dt+1),
Dt := Vˆt+1(xt+1,mt+1).
We now find an upper bound for each term in (38). From
Assumption 1 and equation (17), it results that:
‖`t(xt, dt, γt(xt), γt)− `t(xt,mt, γt(xt), γt‖
ED˜t [
∑
u∈U
ct(xt, u,
n− 1
n
D˜t +
1
n
δ(xt, u))γt(xt)(u)]
− ED˜t [
∑
u∈U
ct(xt, u,Mt)γt(xt)(u)]
≤ Kct ‖dt −mt‖+O(
1√
n
).
In addition, from Lemma 8 and equation (37), one arrives at:∑
xt+1
At(Ct −Dt) ≤ Kvt+1‖dt+1 −mt+1‖+Kot+1O(
1√
n
)
≤ Kvt+1Kmt ‖dt −mt‖+ (Kvt+1 +Kot+1)O(
1√
n
).
From Assumption 1 and Lemma 9, it follows that:∑
xt+1
(At −Bt)Dt ≤ Kpt (
t+1∑
τ=1
βτKcτ )‖dt −mt‖.
Note that
∑
xt+1
BtDt = E[Vˆt+1(xt+1,mt+1) | xt,mt, γt].
Therefore, it results from (38) that
Vt(xt, dt) ≤ Kvt ‖dt −mt‖+KotO(
1√
n
)
+ min
γt(xt)
`t(xt,mt, γt(xt), γt) + E[Vˆt+1(xt+1,mt+1) | xt,mt, γt]
= Kvt ‖dt −mt‖+KotO(
1√
n
) + Vˆt(xt,mt).
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
From the triangle inequality, it results that
|J∗n−Jˆn| ≤ |J∗n−E[Vˆ1(x1,m1)]|+|Jˆn−E[Vˆ1(x1,m1)]|. (39)
The first term of the right-hand side of (39) is bounded as
follows, on noting that J∗n = E[V1(x1, d1)]. For any time t ∈
NT and state x1 ∈ X ,
|E[V1(x1, d1)]− E[Vˆ1(x1,m1)]|(a)≤ E|V1(x1, d1)− Vˆ1(x1,m1)|
(b)
≤K
v
1E[‖d1 −m1‖] +Ko1O(
1√
n
)
(c)
≤K
v
1O(
1√
n
) +Ko1O(
1√
n
),
where (a) follows from the monotonicity of the expectation
operator; (b) follows from Lemma 10, and (c) follows from the
relation m1 = PX and the fact that the empirical distribution
d1 converges to its limit PX in the mean-square sense at the
rate O( 1n ) (see [27, Lemma 2] for more details). Similarly,
the second term of the right-hand side of (39) is also bounded
by O( 1√
n
), on noting that initially xˆ1 = x1 and dˆ1 = d1.
